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Abstract 
This paper contributes to the growing literature on anti-corruption accountability by comparing 
individual decision making under different norms and institutions. Employing an experimental 
methodology, I examine how the propensity to report corruption differs between Northern and 
Southern Italians, two groups that experience very different levels of corruption in everyday life. 
Further, the experiment measures behavior under two different institutional environments: a "strict 
enforcement" condition where reports always result in sanctions against perpetrators, and a "lax 
enforcement" condition where 50% of reports are ignored. I find no difference in the behavior of 
Northern and Southern Italians in the lax enforcement condition, but in the strict enforcement 
condition, Southerners are much more likely to denounce wrongdoing, while the behavior of 
Northerners remains unchanged. These results demonstrate that exposure to corruption may strengthen 
accountability norms, but only in the presence of highquality enforcement institutions. 
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Introduction
The past two decades have witnessed a proliferation of research on possible approaches to
combatting corruption. While one branch of this literature focuses on the design of optimal
institutions to reduce opportunities for graft and increase incentives for honesty (Andvig
et al. 2001; Klitgaard 1988; Rose-Ackerman 1978), other work highlights the many ways in
which ordinary citizens can bring about greater governmental accountability (Adsera`, Boix
and Payne 2003; Besley 2006; Grimes 2013; Olken 2007; Rose-Ackerman 1999; World Bank
2004). And amongst the many possible actions that citizens can take, one of the most
important involves the reporting of corruption to formal oversight agencies.
As many scholars have noted, law enforcement authorities seldom have adequate time and
resources to investigate all potential instances of malfeasance (McCubbins and Schwartz
1984; Sunshine and Tyler 2003; Tyler 2010). Many oversight agencies must therefore depend
upon citizens to sound “fire alarms” to expose corruption and provide evidence against
wrongdoers. Furthermore, while political elites may have incentives to block reform, the same
is not true for citizens, who are often corruption’s primary “victims,” and therefore ideally
placed to push for change (Mungiu-Pippidi 2006). Indeed, case studies of successful anti-
corruption campaigns have highlighted the importance of grassroots monitoring in improving
accountability (Grimes 2013; Manion 2009; Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006).
Yet although the literature often assigns citizens (or civil society) a central role in controlling
corruption, individuals’ motivations to engage in such actions (particularly in endemically-
corrupt societies) remain poorly understood. Does the willingness to engage in grassroots
monitoring di↵er between high-corruption and low-corruption societies? And does the an-
swer depend on whether individuals in these societies have access to e↵ective and e cient
enforcement institutions?
This article explores theoretically and empirically the relationship between institutions, cor-
ruption exposure and anti-corruption monitoring. I report results from an economic ex-
periment involving participants from both the North and the South of Italy. Importantly,
research has shown that the level of corruption di↵ers significantly across these regions
(Banfield 1958; Chang, Golden and Hill 2010; Golden and Picci 2005; Putnam 1993), and
participants who grew up in these separate environments are likely to have internalized dif-
ferent norms about corruption tolerance. The experimental design allows me to isolate the
e↵ect of these norms by holding the quality of enforcement institutions constant. Further, in
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a second treatment, I also vary the probability that someone reported for corruption will be
formally sanctioned, and thereby test whether regional e↵ects depend upon the e↵ectiveness
of formal oversight agencies. By comparing individual decision-making under di↵erent norms
and institutions, this paper contributes to the growing literature on “bottom-up” account-
ability in the anti-corruption context (Barr, Lindelow and Serneels 2009; Bauhr and Grimes
2014; Cameron et al. 2009; Grimes 2013).
This article precedes as follows. The following section discusses the relevant literature on cor-
ruption and social norms, focusing particular attention on how greater exposure to corruption
in everyday life may shape individuals’ willingness to participate in grassroots monitoring. I
then describe the experimental design and the two participant populations, before present-
ing the results. Finally, I discuss several implications of the experimental findings, before
concluding with some suggestions for future research.
Related Literature
Several recent studies have examined the relationship between cultural norms and corruption
(Barr and Serra 2010; Cameron et al. 2009; Fisman and Miguel 2007; Paldam 2002; Treisman
2000). For example, Fisman and Miguel (2007) investigate the parking behavior of United
Nations diplomats during a period in which they were immune from enforcement actions.
Even in the absence of legal constraints, diplomats from low-corruption countries accumu-
lated significantly fewer unpaid parking violations (a form of abuse of o ce), suggesting an
important role for cultural norms in constraining opportunistic behavior. Barr and Serra
(2010) report similar findings from a laboratory experiment in the UK: higher exposure to a
“culture of corruption” in students’ home countries is associated with a greater propensity
to bribe in the lab.1
However, while recent studies focus on variation in corrupt behavior, relatively little research
has examined how corruption tolerance may also vary across societies (Cameron et al. 2009).
However, even though individuals in high-corruption societies may be more likely to engage
in illicit behavior themselves, this does not necessarily mean that they are more likely to
accept such behavior on the part of others. Indeed, ethnographic research has shown that
people can perceive the same corruption scenario as right or wrong, depending on whether
they are the victims or the beneficiaries of the transaction (Hasty 2005; Olivier de Sardan
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1999; Smith 2010). Therefore, it is important to study how everyday exposure to corruption
shapes the norm of accountability.
In theory, greater exposure to corruption in daily life can a↵ect accountability norms in one of
two ways. On the one hand, citizens in high-corruption countries may have a more intimate
understanding of the cost of corruption for society, which can fuel greater public anger and
indignation (Hasty 2005; Miller 2006; Olivier de Sardan 1999; Persson, Rothstein and Teorell
2012; Rothstein and Torsello 2013; Smith 2010). As forcefully argued by Olivier de Sardan
(1999) with regards to Sub-Saharan Africa,
Corruption is...as frequently denounced in words as it is practised in fact [...]
At the everyday level, there is scarcely a conversation without hostile or dis-
gusted references to corruption, either the petty type of which one claims to have
been a victim, or the upper crust type about which one has rumours to spread.
[This condemnation] must be taken seriously, and not just brushed o↵ as mere
superficial rhetoric. (p.29)
Given the degree of public discontent, individuals in high-corruption societies may be more
willing to take a stand against malfeasance, as compared to their counterparts in countries
with lower levels of graft.
On the other hand, socialization into a “culture of corruption” may increase individuals’
acceptance of wrongdoing (Barr, Lindelow and Serneels 2009). This may be especially true
if individuals come to believe that bribery is a routine strategy, employed by all “normal”
citizens, to gain access to public services (Cameron et al. 2009; Miller 2006; Persson, Roth-
stein and Teorell 2012). In this context, to sanction someone for accepting a “gift” would
seem over-scrupulous, hypocritical, or even insensitive to “the way things work.” In this
way, beliefs about the ubiquity of illicit payments serve to justify and excuse such behavior,
thereby weakening the norm of accountability.
Empirical evidence from large-N cross-national studies would seem to support this latter
argument. Figure 1 graphs the relationship between corruption tolerance and country cor-
ruption rankings, as measured by Transparency International (TI)’s 2013 Corruption Per-
ceptions Index. Higher scores along the x-axis indicate a more “honest” society. The y-axis
displays the percentage of individuals who indicated that they would be willing, hypothet-
ically, to report an incident of corruption. The data are drawn from TI’s 2013 Global
Corruption Barometer, and are available for over 100 countries. The figure shows that the
3
higher level of corruption in a country, the less willing its citizens are to report malfeasance,
suggesting that corruption exposure and corruption tolerance are directly related.
Figure 1: Willingness to Report Corruption by Country Corruption Ranking
However, this relationship is complicated by the fact that individuals in di↵erent societies face
di↵erent sets of institutional constraints. In particular, while citizens can report corruption,
they cannot directly enforce the law. Instead, they must depend on formal oversight agencies
to act upon their complaints and sanction the perpetrators (Grimes 2013). However, in
countries where corruption is pervasive, such o ces may be lacking, ine↵ectual, or themselves
deeply corrupted (Bauhr and Grimes 2014). As a consequence, citizens may appear to
tolerate corruption not because of moral lassitude, but rather because they perceive e↵orts
to sound the alarm as futile (Persson, Rothstein and Teorell 2012).
The failure to precisely distinguish the institutional versus normative drivers of bottom-up
accountability has profound policy implications. If citizens are socialized into a “culture of
corruption,” then institutional reforms are unlikely to unleash a wellspring of popular action,
and greater accountability most likely arises from more stringent top-down monitoring. By
contrast, if citizens in highly-corrupt societies are indeed fed up with graft, then it may be
possible to harness this popular indignation in the fight against corruption, provided that
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the necessary institutional tools are available. However, using cross-national data, it is often
di cult to identify whether we are in the former case or the latter (because we rarely observe
highly-corrupt states with e↵ective enforcement institutions, and vice versa).
In principle, economic experiments can help tease apart the influence of institutional and
normative factors on the willingness to blow the whistle on corrupt behavior. By allowing
researchers to directly control the “rules of the game,” experiments can isolate the e↵ect
of normative constraints, as well as simulate di↵erent institutional conditions. Yet, the few
studies that have adopted this approach have produced inconclusive results. For example,
Cameron et al. (2009) compared participants from four societies with di↵erent corruption
levels (Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore) in terms of their propensity to both en-
gage in and punish bribery. Surprisingly, Cameron et al. (2009) find support for both of
the arguments discussed above: while Australians tended to be more critical of corruption
than Indians (which would support the acceptance hypothesis), Singaporeans appeared to
be more tolerant of bribery than Indonesians (which would support the indignation hypoth-
esis). Given these mixed results, more cross-cultural research examining how exposure to
corruption a↵ects accountability norms is needed. The experiment described in the following
section contributes to filling this gap.
Methodology
The Corruption Game
The experiment described in this paper consists of a very simple bribery game which sim-
ulates petty corruption in a public hospital setting in Italy, a country noted for its large
North-South variation in corruption levels (Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente 2013a,b; Golden
and Picci 2005; Putnam 1993).2 This setting was selected because the medical sector is re-
garded as amongst the more corruption-ridden institutions in Italian society.3 Furthermore,
while we may doubt that ordinary citizens have encountered corruption in other scenarios
(e.g. public procurements), participants are likely to have a more concrete idea of how cor-
ruption in the health sector operates.4 Finally, since public hospitals in Italy are public
institutions, individuals should expect impartial treatment, and any personal favoritism is
likely to be understood as corruption. Overall, the framing brings a measure of realism, and
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a↵ords us greater confidence that behavior in the lab will more faithfully reflect choices in
real life.5
In the experiment, the participants were randomly assigned to one of three roles: Nurse,
Early Patient (PE), or Late Patient (PL). Essentially, PLs must decide whether to o↵er
(and Nurses must decide whether to accept) a “gift” in exchange for faster service. PEs are
harmed by this transaction, and must decide whether to punish corrupt Nurses by reporting
them to the hospital administration.
The full game is described below. However, in this paper, I am mainly interested in how social
norms and institutions a↵ect the decision to blow the whistle on corruption. Therefore, in
my analysis, I focus attention only on the behavior of PEs, and the main dependent variable
under consideration is the rate at which PEs report corrupt transactions.
Overall, the experiment is very similar to the designs employed by Barr and Serra (2010) and
Cameron et al. (2009). As in Cameron et al. (2009)’s experiment, the victim of corruption
(the PE) is allowed to punish the beneficiaries. However, the imposition of sanctions here
is dependent upon an exogenous institution (the hospital administration), which may or
may not act on the report. In addition, as in the previous two studies, all interactions
are anonymous and one-shot. This ensures that punishment conveys no economic benefit,
so that the decision to denounce corruption is not a↵ected by the anticipation of possible
future economic gains.6 Therefore, PEs’ willingness to report should directly reflect norms
of accountability.
Both PEs and PLs begin the experiment with an initial endowment of 32 experimental
currency units (ECU). The patients were told to imagine that they are waiting in line to
see the doctor. Waiting is costly for Patients, but because PEs have arrived early at the
hospital, they face a very short wait and can keep their entire initial endowment. However,
PLs face a very long wait and, as a result, will lose 16 ECU. PLs thus retain 32 - 16 = 16
ECU in the round.
However, PLs can potentially skip the line and avoid this loss. Each PL is randomly matched
to one Nurse,7 and has the option of o↵ering this Nurse a “gift” worth 6 ECU in exchange
for being allowed to jump the queue.8 In other words, if the PL makes an o↵er and the Nurse
accepts, the PL no longer has to wait, and consequently earns 32 - 6 = 26 ECU. Although
in this case the PL pays the cost of the gift, he is much better o↵ at the front of the queue
(with 26 ECU) than at the back (with 16 ECU). O↵ering a gift is a dominant strategy in the
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game: if the PL chooses not to o↵er, he is sure to lose 16 ECU. The same result obtains if
the PL o↵ers a gift but his o↵er is rejected by the Nurse (however, having your o↵er rejected
carries no additional cost). On the other hand, the PL’s earnings increase from 16 to 26 if
his o↵er is accepted. Therefore, PLs can only gain by o↵ering.
For their part, Nurses must decide whether to accept gifts from Patients. Nurses begin the
game with 24 ECU, and retain this amount if they are o↵ered no gifts, or if they refuse to
accept PL o↵ers. On the other hand, if they decide to accept gifts (and in exchange permit
PLs to skip the line), they will receive 6 additional ECU for each gift they receive.9 Nurses
do not know exactly how many PLs they are interacting with in each round, but must choose
what they would do if any gifts are o↵ered.
As a consequence of the exchange between the PL and the Nurse, all of the PEs must wait
a little longer in line and each su↵ers a small loss of 3 ECU. However, PEs are not merely
passive bystanders in the game, but rather operate as potential monitors. Specifically, each
PE is randomly matched to one Nurse, and is told that he can “overhear” conversations
between this Nurse and other patients, so that he will know if this Nurse has exchanged any
favors. PEs can then report this Nurse to the hospital administration, which may or may
not impose a fine. If the Nurse is sanctioned, he forfeits any gifts he has received, and also
pays a fine of 9 ECU, so that he retains only 24 - 9 = 15 ECU at the end of the round.
However, reporting is always costly to the PE, who must pay a reporting “fee” of 3 ECU
regardless of whether the Nurse is actually punished. In fact, from the PE’s perspective,
reporting is never rational in a one-shot game: even if the Nurse is fined, PLs who have
skipped the line still remain at the front. In other words, PEs will always lose for every
PL that skips the line, irrespective of their own actions. All players make their decisions
simultaneously, and the one-shot game has a single equilibrium outcome: all PLs o↵er gifts,
no PEs report corrupt exchanges, and all Nurses accept o↵ers.
Finally, the experiment is implemented under two di↵erent conditions, which simulate two
di↵erent levels of institutional e↵ectiveness. In the “lax enforcement” version, the PE’s
report results in the imposition of a sanction only 50% of the time. The other 50% of the
time, the Nurse pays no fine and keeps whatever gifts he has received. However, in the
“strict enforcement” version, a Nurse who is reported by a PE is sanctioned 100% of the
time. Importantly, although the incentives facing Nurses change across the two conditions,
the monetary payo↵s facing PEs remain identical: any indication of a willingness to punish
corruption costs 3 ECU, regardless of whether the punishment is actually imposed.
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Procedure
The experiments reported in this paper were conducted as part of a larger research project on
corruption which I implemented at [Northern Italian university] in 2013.10 [Northern Italian
university] maintains an electronic database of students who have signed up to participate
in behavioral experiments (Greiner 2004). Several days prior to the start of the experiment,
individuals in the database received an email informing them of the opportunity to take part
in an upcoming research project, and inviting them to sign up for an experimental session
at a particular date and time. The email also included information on the estimated length
of each session, as well as the expected earnings per participant.
Once the participants arrived at the laboratory at the appointed date and time, they were
provided with a randomly-drawn anonymous ID number, and assigned to a corresponding
personal computer terminal.11 The participants undertook all the experimental tasks via
computer, and the terminals were partitioned to ensure that individuals could not commu-
nicate during the experiment, nor observe what other people were doing. The participants
were also informed that they would have the opportunity to earn ECU during the experi-
ment, which would be converted into real money at the end of the session. At this point,
the participants were asked to sign a consent form informing them that their decisions and
payments would remain anonymous, and that they could discontinue participation in the
experiment at any time. Any individual who wishes to leave the experiment early could
elect to receive a 3 euro show-up fee. However, in practice, every participant remained until
the end of the session.
We begin the session by conducting a short computerized survey to capture basic demo-
graphic characteristics (e.g. gender, age, etc), before proceeding to explain the rules of the
experiment. The participants make decisions for three rounds. In each round, players are
randomly assigned to a new role, so that by the end of the game, the players have had the
chance to play in all 3 roles. Importantly, the players were shown the results of each round
only at the end of the entire session, i.e. after all of the experimental tasks had been com-
pleted. This feature, coupled with the fact that the participants are randomly rematched in
each period, means that behavior in the game should be una↵ected by signaling, reputation
formation, wealth e↵ects or serial correlation in decisions (Cameron et al. 2009). Finally,
since the rules are somewhat complex and the payo↵s hard to keep track of, at the moment
of making their decision, the players were shown a summary of their choices and the possi-
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ble consequences for themselves and for other participants. In general, the vast majority of
participants rated their own understanding of the game as excellent.
Upon completion of the experimental tasks, the participants were shown feedback on their
decisions, and informed of their total earnings. The participants then answered a short
debrief questionnaire before receiving payment. On average, each session lasted 1 hour and
10 minutes and the participants were paid approximately 13 euros (USD 17.50).
Participants
I employ a version of Barr and Serra (2010)’s recruitment strategy to capture variation
in corruption exposure. In particular, this strategy assumes that students in the same
university may have been exposed to di↵erent levels of corruption in their home societies. If
such di↵erential exposure leads to the development of di↵erent norms, then such e↵ects may
manifest in behavior in the lab. Along these lines, [Northern Italian university] admits a large
student body, and enrolls students not only from its surrounding region of [anonymized], but
also from the South of Italy.12 Furthermore, as shown in Table 1, citizens from the South tend
to have much higher exposure to corruption (including with respect to the health sector) than
their compatriots further North, which may be reflected in di↵erent accountability norms.
Finally, if participants bring these norms into the experiment, then we should see di↵erences
in the reporting decisions of Northern and Southern Italians.
To ensure a rough geographic balance, recruitment to the experiment was stratified by par-
ticipants’ region of origin, and the institutional treatments were randomly assigned within
each stratum. In all, the data reported in this paper are drawn from ten di↵erent experi-
mental sessions involving a total of 156 participants (44% from the North, and 56% from the
South). In the overall sample, 51.3% of the participants were male, and the average age was
slightly over 25 (s.d. = 3.7 years). A large minority (39.7%) were undergraduate students,
while the remainder were masters students.13
Table 2 compares demographic characteristics across Northern and Southern participants
and treatment groups, and reports p-values for di↵erences in means.14 Reading each row
from left to right, we see that Northerners and Southerners are roughly balanced on almost
all characteristics in each of the treatment groups. Reading each column from top to bottom,
we see no statistically significant di↵erences for Northerners across institutional treatments.
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Table 1: Perceptions of Corruption across Italian Regions
Rating of Regional Health Care
Others Self
Corrupt Bribe Quality Impartiality Corruption Average
Region (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Trento N 0.87 -0.09 1.80 1.38 0.96 0.98
Bolzano N 0.89 -0.02 1.77 1.35 0.91 0.98
Valle d’Acosta N 0.55 -0.22 1.66 1.18 0.37 0.71
Friuli-Venezia Giulia N 0.83 -0.58 1.10 0.91 0.25 0.50
Veneto N 0.37 -0.93 0.69 0.41 -0.33 0.04
Emilia-Romagna N 0.07 -0.90 0.76 0.48 -0.31 0.02
Lombardia N -0.31 -0.86 1.09 0.10 -0.99 -0.19
Toscana N 0.42 -1.19 0.13 -0.03 -0.48 -0.23
Marche C -0.04 -0.38 -0.20 -0.27 -0.47 -0.27
Piemonte N -0.02 -1.00 0.37 -0.11 -0.82 -0.31
Umbria C -0.16 -0.64 -0.11 0.02 -0.79 -0.34
Liguria N -0.09 -1.29 -0.21 -0.03 -1.01 -0.53
Abruzzo S -0.44 -1.58 -0.87 -0.60 -0.91 -0.88
Sardegna - -0.25 -1.42 -0.87 -0.83 -1.07 -0.89
Lazio C -0.54 -1.67 -0.99 -0.44 -1.20 -0.97
Basilicata S -0.88 -1.65 -0.53 -1.11 -1.16 -1.06
Sicilia S -1.05 -1.49 -1.26 -0.68 -1.18 -1.13
Molise S -0.90 -1.78 -1.54 -0.97 -1.47 -1.33
Puglia S -1.18 -1.26 -1.46 -1.23 -1.64 -1.35
Calabria S -1.21 -1.62 -2.08 -0.87 -1.58 -1.47
Campania S -1.63 -2.03 -1.44 -1.31 -1.69 -1.62
Data from the 2013 European Quality of Governance Index (Charron, Dijkstra and Lapuente
2013a,b). Scores are based on survey responses about the following topics: (1) the amount of
perceived bribery by others in the respondents’ area; (2) the respondents’ own experience with
bribery in the public sector; (3) the quality of the public health care system in the respondents’
area; (4) the impartiality of the public health care system in the respondents’ area; and (5)
perceived corruption of the public health care system in the respondents’ area. All ratings have
been standardized. Regional classifications are given by N = North, C = Central, and S =
South.
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However, for Southerners, there are fewer undergraduates in the strict enforcement treat-
ment. I control for this fact in the analyses reported below.
Table 2: Di↵erence in Means (t-tests): Regional and Treatment Groups
Full Sample North South p-values
(N = 156) (N = 68) (N = 88) (regional e↵ects)
A. Both Treatments Pooled North-South
Male 0.513 0.500 0.523 0.780
Age 25.263 25.059 25.420 0.557
Undergrad 0.397 0.368 0.420 0.506
B. Lax Enforcement Treatment
Male 0.534 0.500 0.565 0.546
Age 24.955 24.857 25.043 0.816
Undergrad 0.466 0.405 0.522 0.277
C. Strict Enforcement Treatment
Male 0.485 0.500 0.476 0.852
Age 25.662 25.385 25.833 0.658
Undergrad 0.309 0.308 0.310 0.988
p-values (treatment e↵ects)
Male 0.549 1.000 0.410
Age 0.244 0.614 0.300
Undergrad 0.045* 0.422 0.044*
Asterisks (*) denote statistically significant di↵erences at the 5% level.
Research Questions
If all individuals are perfectly selfish, nobody would report corruption in either of the in-
stitutional conditions, since reporting leaves PEs strictly worse o↵. However, if PEs are
motivated by a norm of accountability, they may choose to denounce corrupt Nurses de-
spite the monetary disincentives.15 Moreover, the literature also shows that accountability
norms can di↵er across societies (Herrmann, Tho¨ni and Ga¨chter 2008) in ways that may be
related to the institutional environment (Bauhr and Grimes 2014; Persson, Rothstein and
Teorell 2012). I therefore designed the experiment with the following research questions in
mind:
1. Do participants from societies with higher levels of corruption report bribery less fre-
quently than participants from societies with lower levels of corruption?
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2. Do these e↵ects depend upon the quality of enforcement institutions (i.e. the proba-
bility that these reports will be acted upon)?
Results and Discussion
How do norms and institutions interact to shape the reporting of corrupt behavior? Over-
all, 90 out of 156 participants (57.7%) indicated a willingness to report a corrupt Nurse.
As a preliminary step, we can break this number down in two ways. First, pooling both
institutional conditions, we observe very little di↵erence in the choices of Northerners and
Southerners: 57.4% of Northerners indicated that they would make a report, compared to
58.0% of Southerners (p-value = 0.94). Second, if we pool Northerners and Southerners,
we find weak evidence of an institutional e↵ect: while only 52.3% of participants in the lax
enforcement treatment were willing to report, this number rises to 64.7% in the strict en-
forcement treatment. However, this di↵erence is not statistically significant at conventional
levels (p-value = 0.12).
These comparisons obscure the fact that Northerners and Southerners may behave di↵er-
ently, depending upon the institutional condition to which they have been assigned. This
interaction e↵ect is illustrated in Figure 2. Here we see that while an approximately equal
number of Northerners (57% - 58%) chose to report in both the lax and strict enforcement
regimes, the reporting rate amongst Southerners is lower under lax enforcement (48%), but
higher under strict enforcement (69%). In other words, it seems that the institutional treat-
ment e↵ect is driven almost entirely by the behavior of Southern participants.
To check the robustness of these findings, I report the marginal e↵ects and corresponding
standard errors and significance levels from a series of Probit estimations in Table 3. Columns
(1) and (2) confirm the null results from the unconditional comparison of reporting rates
across cultural and treatment groups, respectively. In column (3), I add an interaction term
between Northern participants and assignment to the strict enforcement condition. The pos-
itive coe cient on North suggests that under lax enforcement, Northerners are slightly more
likely to report than Southerners, although this e↵ect is also not statistically significant. By
contrast, the estimated coe cient on Strict now indicates that for Southern participants, in-
dividuals in the strict enforcement treatment are significantly more likely to report than their
peers in the lax enforcement treatment. Notice also that the coe cient on the interaction
term is almost identical in size, except that it is negative, suggesting that the corresponding
12
Figure 2: Willingness to Report Corruption:
Northerners and Southerners by Treatment Conditions
Table 3: Probit Analyses of the Willingness to Report
Full Sample Masters Undergrads
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
North -0.006 0.091 0.088 0.059 0.065
(0.105) (0.142) (0.145) (0.136) (0.147)
Strict 0.124 0.212* 0.220* 0.051 0.517***
(0.094) (0.120) (0.114) (0.116) (0.148)
North*Strict -0.212 -0.215 -0.101 -0.465*
(0.182) (0.186) (0.180) (0.242)
Age and gender No No No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 156 156 156 156 94 62
Note: robust standard errors, in parentheses, have been adjusted to account for
clustering within sessions. I report the marginal e↵ects of continuous variables and
the e↵ect of a change from 0 to 1 for dichotomous variables. * Significant at 10%;
** significant at 5%; *** Significant at 1%.
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treatment e↵ect for Northerners is close to zero (although the interaction is not significant
at conventional levels).
Column (4) adds controls for age and gender (the results are unchanged), but does not control
for undergraduate status. Instead, I have elected to rerun the above analysis separately for
undergraduates and masters students (columns 5 and 6). This is because previous research
has shown that the di↵erence between undergraduate and graduate students may moderate
“cultural” e↵ects in corruption games, and therefore it may be appropriate to consider the
two groups separately. For example, Barr and Serra (2010) find that although the behavior
of Oxford undergraduate students reflects the corruption norms of their home countries, the
same is not true for graduates.
Figure 3: North-South and Treatment E↵ects by Educational Level
As shown in Figure 3, I find a similar e↵ect in my experiment. Specifically, amongst masters
students, there are no significant di↵erences in the propensity to report across regional and
treatment groups. However, the main patterns from Figure 2 are even more starkly displayed
amongst undergraduates: compared to the lax enforcement condition, the reporting rate is
a whopping 51.7% higher amongst Southerners in strict enforcement condition, and this
e↵ect is much stronger than the corresponding e↵ect for Northerners (as indicated by the
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now significantly negative coe cient on the interaction term in column (6) of Table 3.) In
summary, it appears that the institutional e↵ect of stronger enforcement is region-specific,
and applies only to the undergraduates in my sample.
Why might masters students from Southern Italy behave di↵erently from their undergrad-
uate counterparts? Barr and Serra (2010) outline two possible explanations: selection and
secondary socialization. Selection may account for the split results if the types of individuals
who become masters students hold di↵erent values and norms than the types of individuals
who are not masters students. Selection presents a problem because it indicates that the
experimental findings do not generalize to the larger population of Italians. However, in my
sample, undergraduates and masters students are not drawn from two mutually-exclusive
segments of the population. Instead, undergraduates all have the potential to become mas-
ters students; they have simply not yet been presented with the option of continuing their
studies. Therefore, there is likely to be substantial overlap in terms of the types of individ-
uals who fall into the two categories. For this reason, it is unlikely that the split results are
an artifact of selection bias.
Secondary socialization presents us with a di↵erent issue: in particular, it may be the case
that individuals from the South of Italy gradually assimilate Northern norms of accountabil-
ity as they spend more time at [Northern Italian University]. Socialization may well explain
why the behavior of Southern masters students is indistinguishable from that of Northern-
ers in general (both masters and undergraduates). Furthermore, since undergraduates from
the South are less exposed to Northern norms, their decisions in the experiment are more
likely to reflect the patterns prevailing in their native region. Importantly, in this case, the
split results do not compromise the generalizability of the findings, since it is the behavior
of undergraduates that captures most faithfully the e↵ects of early-life exposure to varying
corruption levels.
Overall, the main results are largely consistent with the indignation hypothesis, and demon-
strate that greater exposure to corruption does not necessarily lead to greater corruption
tolerance. Rather, the lesson seems to be that Southern Italians are, as a whole, even less
accepting of corruption than their Northern counterparts, considering the greater harm it
causes in their everyday lives. However, although Southerners are willing to act on their in-
dignation, they may only do so provided that they have the institutional means to e↵ectively
sanction the perpetrators.
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Can any alternative explanations account for these findings? One possibility may be that
the results merely reflect di↵ering propensities to punish in general across societies, rather
than di↵erent norms of accountability specific to corruption. For example, writing in the
U.S. context, Nisbett and Cohen (1996) argue that individuals growing up in the American
South are socialized into a “culture of honor” that makes them more likely to retaliate against
perceived personal o↵enses. While the issue of whether Southern Italians are more honor
conscious is certainly an interesting question worthy of additional research, this account
cannot explain why Southern participants in this experiment are more likely to make a
report only in the strict enforcement condition. Neither can this interpretation explain why
the behavior of Northerners does not change under the di↵erent institutional settings.
A more plausible objection might attribute these results to sample selection of a di↵erent
sort than that previously discussed. In particular, it may be the case that the Southerners
who choose to migrate to the North of Italy are especially fed up with corruption in their
home regions, and therefore seize upon the opportunity to punish it. But here again, the
fact that Southern participants in the “lax enforcement” condition act no more scrupulously
that Northerners suggests that selection is unlikely to drive the e↵ects we observe. However,
future research might address this possibility directly by replicating the present experiment
at a Southern university.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to understand how norms and institutions shape citizens’ decisions to
hold corrupt actors accountable. It investigates how the propensity to report corrupt behav-
ior in an experimental setting varies between Northern and Southern Italians, two groups
that experience very di↵erent levels of corruption in everyday life. The experiment also
varies the strength of enforcement institutions, which many scholars believe to significantly
influence the willingness to denounce malfeasance. I find that while institutional quality does
not a↵ect the behavior of Northern participants, Southern participants are significantly more
likely to report corruption under a strict enforcement regime. More specifically, this e↵ect
seems to be driven by the behavior of undergraduate participants - i.e. those individuals who
have most recently moved from the South to [Northern Italian university]. Overall, the study
shows that individuals from a “high corruption” society can indeed be engaged in the fight
against corruption, provided that the right institutional arrangements are in place.
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More generally, the findings argue for an endogenous model of accountability where “bottom-
up” and “top-down” enforcement e↵orts are mutually reinforcing. In particular, at the out-
set, the enforcement authorities demonstrate their credibility by acting upon citizen reports
and punishing high-profile perpetrators. These actions serve to strengthen the belief that
citizens are now facing a “strict enforcement” regime, and thereby generate more frequent
“fire alarms” from the public. The loop is closed as greater civic engagement multiplies the
investigatory and prosecutorial capacities of the formal authorities.16
Yet while the experimental results suggest that such a virtuous cycle is indeed possible,
they also raise several question about the scope conditions under which such a process
might occur. How representative are North and South Italy of “honest” and “corrupt”
societies more generally? Even controlling for the institutional environment, might exposure
to widespread malfeasance breed indignation in some societies, but corruption acceptance in
others? And how might these results depend upon the specific situational context (i.e. the
hospital setting) examined?
As Cameron et al. (2009) note, the relationship between norms of accountability and cor-
ruption exposure is extremely complex, and this paper is one of the first to study this phe-
nomenon with an eye towards incorporating institutional e↵ects. However, more research on
a wider range of societies with di↵ering levels of corruption and institutional e↵ectiveness is
needed to fully resolve these outstanding questions.
Notes
1The correlation is significant only for undergraduate students, but not graduate students. One explana-
tion may be that home-country norms converge to the UK norm over time.
2Although standard practice is to use neutral language, I deliberately chose to frame my experiment in
order to simulate a real-life corrupt transaction. As noted by Harrison and List (2004), abstract context-
free experiments do not necessarily provide more general findings if the context itself is relevant to the
decision-problem facing participants. On the other hand, Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt (2006) find that
loaded language does not make a di↵erence in the corruption game they study.
3A 2013 survey by Transparency International revealed that 54% of Italians rated the medical services in
their country as either “corrupt” or “very corrupt.”
4As one participant noted in a follow-up survey: “...in real life, I encountered a similar example [to the
one described in the game].”
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5Another participant stated, “I pretended to place myself in exactly the same situation as described in the
game. If in real life I had to confront such a scenario, I would behave [in the way I did in the game].”
6By contrast, in a multi-period game, individuals may choose to punish in the hope of deterring corruption
and decreasing future harm (Heckathorn 1989).
7A technical note on the matching procedure: every PL is assigned to play with exactly one Nurse.
However, it could very well be the case that a particular Nurse has more than one PL matched to him, and
also that some Nurses have no PLs matched with them.
8All exchanges are phrased as ”gifts” or ”favors” in the game. At no point in the experiment was the
word “bribe” used.
9Recall that Nurses can have more than one PL matched to them, and so receive more than one o↵er of
a gift. To be exact, Nurses must decide whether to accept all gifts that are o↵ered, or to accept none.
10The data and .do files used to produce the results reported in the paper are available directly from the
author.
11The experiment was programmed in zTree (Fischbacher 2007).
12Universities in the North tend to be much better than those in the South. As a result, northward
migration is quite common, but few Northerners make the opposite trek South.
13Importantly, none of the students considered here are economics majors. This was done to maximize
behavioral variation across the two populations. Many studies have shown that economists tend to look for
the profit maximizing strategy in lab experiments, so including economists in the analysis would reduce the
influence of normative factors. Although I attempted to exclude economists at the recruitment stage, some
showed up at the sessions nonetheless. I allowed them to participate in order to have a full session, but I
exclude their data from the analysis.
14I also conducted Z-tests and non-parametric rank sum tests of di↵erences in distribution. The results
were very similar to the t-tests reported.
15For more general research in behavioral economics on costly punishment of anti-social behavior, see Fehr
and Ga¨chter (2000, 2002); Henrich et al. (2006).
16See Manion (2009) for a description of a similar process in 1970s Hong Kong.
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